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Abstract			Dual	 class	 shares	 (DCS)	 offer	 additional	 classes	 of	 shares	 that	 provide	 holders	with	greater	voting	 rights.	The	paper	aims	 to	 investigate	why	 leading	 financial	centres	have	different	attitudes	towards	DCS,	with	a	focus	on	the	recent	reforms	of	their	company	law	and	listing	rules	with	respect	to	DCS.				
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		Dual	Class	Shares	Around	the	Top	Global	Financial	Centres				
I. Introduction		Dual	 class	 shares	 (DCS)	 which	 could	 be	 created	 either	 through	 initial	 public	offerings	(IPOs)	or	recapitalisations,	offer	different	classes	of	shares	that	confer	distinct	voting	and	control	rights	on	the	holder.	The	divergence	provides	insiders	with	 a	 majority	 of	 voting	 rights,	 despite	 their	 smaller	 residual	 claims.1	The	popularity	of	DCS	has	been	paralleled	with	a	 takeover	wave	since	1980	and	an	increasing	 number	 of	 technology	 companies	 entering	 the	 stock	market.2	Many	US	 companies	 like	 Google,	 Facebook,	 Groupon	 and	 LinkedIn,	 have	 favoured	 a	DCS	structure.	However,	not	everywhere	like	the	US	welcome	such	structure.3		DCS,	despite	having	long	existed,	are	back	to	spotlight	again	due	to	the	listing	of	Alibaba	on	the	New	York	Stock	Exchange	(NYSE),	the	largest	IPO	in	history.4	The	company	 chose	 the	NYSE	over	 the	Hong	Kong	 Stock	Exchange	 (HKEx)	 and	 the	London	Stock	Exchange	(LSE)	as	the	latter	two	prohibit	the	listing	of	companies	that	employ	 ‘differential	voting	structures’,	namely	DCS,	while	such	structure	is	permitted	 in	 the	US.	The	request	by	 the	company	 in	 its	 IPO	application	 for	 the	granting	of	an	exemption	from	the	one	share-one	vote	principle	has	brought	the	debate	 over	whether	 the	 bourses	 should	 relax	 their	 listing	 standards	 to	 allow	certain	listed	companies	to	adopt	DCS.			The	paper	aims	to	find	out	why	the	major	jurisdictions	particularly	those	leading	financial	 centres	have	different	views	on	DCS	and	how	divergent	 they	are.	The																																																									1	The	dual	class	structure	essentially	creates	a	concentration	of	control	that	differs	from	concentrated	ownership	in	general.	See	Walid	Ben-Amar	and	Paul	Andre,	‘Separation	of	Ownership	from	Control	and	Acquiring	Firm	Performance:	The	Case	of	Family	Ownership	in	Canada’	(2006)	33	Journal	of	Business	Finance	&	Accounting	517.	2	Gregg	Jarrell	and	Annette	Poulsen,	'Dual-Class	Recapitalisation	as	Antitakeover	Mechanisms'	(1988)	20	Journal	of	Financial	Economics	129;	and	Kristian	Rydqvist,	‘Dual-Class	Shares:	A	Review’	(1992)	8	Oxford	Review	of	Economic	Policy	45,	48.	3	HKEx,	‘Concept	Paper	Weighted	Voting	Rights’	(2014),	40,	at	<http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/newsconsul/mktconsul/Documents/cp2014082.pdf	>	accessed	26	July	2015.	Basically	speaking,	there	are	three	types	of	approaches	to	DCS	around	the	world.	The	first	category	is	jurisdictions	which	permit	such	regime	in	both	their	corporate	law	and	listing	rules	(e.g.	the	US,	Canada	and	Sweden).	The	second	category	is	to	allow	company	to	have	DCS	but	having	restrictions	on	listed	companies,	(e.g.	Hong	Kong,	UK	and	Australia).	The	third	one	is	that	both	corporate	law	and	listing	rules	prohibit	DCS	structure,	(e.g.	Germany,	Spain	and	Mainland	China).	4	On	19	September	2014,	Alibaba,	the	largest	Chinese	e-commerce	company,	completed	the	largest	IPO	on	the	NYSE,	raising	US$25	billion	and	surpassing	the	2010	offering	from	the	Agricultural	Bank	of	China.	See	Nicole	Bullock	et	al,	‘Alibaba	Closes	at	$93.89	in	NYSE	Debut’	(Financial	Times,	20	September	2014),	at		<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8150f416-4002-11e4-a381-00144feabdc0.html#slide0>	accessed	26	July	2015.		
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target	 is	on	the	top	5	global	 financial	centres,	namely	New	York,	London,	Hong	Kong,	 Singapore	 and	 Tokyo,5	partly	 because	 of	 their	 significance	 to	 the	 world	economy,	partly	because	of	 the	close	association	between	 financial	centres	and	stock	exchanges.6	The	paper	is	structured	as	follows.	After	introduction,	Section	II	 will	 discuss	 the	 controversies	 of	 DCS	 from	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	perspectives.	Section	III	will	 investigate	the	attitudes	of	the	five	global	financial	centres	 towards	 DCS	 respectively,	 with	 a	 focus	 on	 the	 recent	 reforms	 of	 their	company	 law	 and	 listing	 rules	 with	 respect	 to	 DCS.	 Section	 IV	 concludes	 by	discussing	the	implication	for	other	jurisdictions.			
II. Controversies	over	Dual	Class	Shares:	Theoretical	and	Evidential	
Analysis			Lawyers	and	economists	have	divided	opinions	on	DCS.	In	theory,	DCS	have	been	long	 criticised	 for	 violating	 the	 one	 share-one	 vote	 principle	 and	 destroying	shareholder	democracy.7	One	 share-one	vote	 is	 frequently	described	as	a	 ‘legal	consequence’	 of	 shareholder	 primacy,	 and	 a	 bedrock	 principle	 of	 corporate	governance.8	The	 rationale	 for	 one	 share-one	 vote	 is	 that	 shareholders,	 as	residual	 claimants,	 have	 the	 strongest	 interest	 in	 maximising	 firm	 value	 and	should	therefore	have	equal	voting	rights.9	In	contrast,	 the	disjunction	between																																																									5	Z/Yen	Group,	‘Global	Financial	Centres	Index	17’,	March	2015,	4,	at	<http://www.longfinance.net/images/GFCI17_23March2015.pdf>	accessed	26	July	2015.	In	the	light	of	market	capitalisation	by	June	2015,	the	NYSE	ranked	No1	largest	stock	exchange	in	the	world,	followed	by	Nasda	(2nd),	TSE	(4th),	LSE	(5th),	HKEx	(7th)	and	SGX	(21st).	Data	from	World	Federation	of	Exchanges,	Monthly	report	as	of	30	June	2015,	at<	http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/monthly-query-tool>	accessed	26	July	2015.	6	Cassis	states	that	stock	exchanges	set	the	pulse	of	financial	centres.	See	Youssef	Cassis,	Capitals	
of	Capital	The	Rise	and	Fall	of	International	Financial	Centres	1780–2009,	(2nd	ed.,	CUP	2006),	6.	The	Top	10	financial	centres	in	the	world,	according	to	the	Global	Financial	Centre	Index,	all	have		stock		exchange		headquarters.		Stock	exchanges		certainly		contribute		to		financial		centres		in		tangible		(employment,		infrastructure)		and		intangible		ways		(image,		brand,		reputation).	See	Dariusz	Wójcik,	‘Revolution	in	the	Stock	Exchange	Industry:		Two-sided	Platforms,	Battle	for	Liquidity,	and	Financial	Centres’	(2010),	2,	at		<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1653827>	accessed	26	July	2015.	7	Sanford	Grossman	and	Oliver	Hart,	‘One	Share-One	Vote	and	the	Market	for	Corporate	Control’	(1988)	20	Journal	of	Financial	Economics	175.	Milton	Harris	and	Artur	Raviv,	‘Corporate	Governance:	Voting	Rights	and	Majority	Rules’	(1988)	20	Journal	of	Financial	Economics	203.	Milton	Harris	and	Artur	Raviv,	‘The	Design	of	Securities’	(1989)	24	Journal	of	Financial	Economics	255.	The	three	articles	support	the	optimality	of	the	one	share-one	vote	rule	and	argue	that	multiple	classes	of	shares	are	not	socially	optimal.	8	Frank	n	and	Daniel	Fischel,	The	Economic	Structure	of	Corporate	Law	(Harvard	University	Press	1991),	73	(‘Votes	follow	the	residual	interest	in	the	firm,	and	unless	each	element	of	the	residual	interest	carries	an	equal	voting	right,	there	will	be	a	needless	agency	cost	of	management.’);	and	Colleen	Dunlavy,	‘Social	Conceptions	of	the	Corporation:	Insights	from	the	History	of	Shareholder	Voting	Rights’	(2006)	63	Washington	and	Lee	Law	Review	1347,	1367.	However,	Hayden	and	Bodle	argue	that	the	assumption	of	shareholder	homogeneity	is	false	as	corporate	democracies	tend	to	define	the	requisite	institutional	interest	too	narrowly	and	thus	restrict	the	right	to	vote	to	shareholders	alone.	See	Grant	Hayden	and	Mattew	Bodle,	‘One	Share,	One	Vote	and	the	False	Promise	of	Shareholders	Homogeneity’	(2008)	30	Cardozo	Law	Review	445.	9	Herry	Manne	‘Some	Theoretical	Aspects	of	Share	Voting:	An	Essay	in	Honor	of	Adolf	A.	Berle’	(1964)	64	Columbia	Law	Review	1427;	Frank	Easterbrook	and	Daniel	Fischel,	‘Voting	in	Corporate	Law’	(1983)	26	Journal	of	Law	and	Economics	395.	
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economic	 interest	and	voting	power	 resulting	 from	deviations	 from	one	share-one	 vote	 would	 makes	 blockholders	 more	 prone	 to	 pursue	 value-maximising	actions.	 In	 the	 view	 of	 Easterbrook	 and	 Fischel,	 ‘[t]hose	with	 disproportionate	voting	 power	will	 not	 receive	 shares	 of	 the	 residual	 gains	 or	 losses	 from	 new	endeavors	and	arrangements	commensurate	with	their	control;	as	a	result,	they	will	 not	 make	 optimal	 decisions.’10	However,	 theory	 also	 recognises	 that	 one	share-one	vote	comes	with	costs	as	it	may	deter	entrepreneurs	from	going	public	to	 avoid	 the	 risk	 of	 the	 control	 and	 impair	 blockholders’	 ability	 to	 monitor	management.11		The	benefits	and	costs	of	DCS	are	summarised	in	the	Canadian	Coalition	for	Good	Governance	 (CCGG)	 publication	 on	 dual	 class	 share	 policy.12	On	 the	 one	 hand,	DCS	 structures	 allow	managers	 to	 concentrate	 on	 the	 sustainable	 success	 and	profitability	of	the	company,	despite	fluctuations	in	quarterly	results.13	Without	worry	about	dismissal,	managers	will	have	less	incentive	to	manage	earnings	at	the	expense	of	long-term	value.	In	addition,	they	could	also	effectively	reduce	the	likelihood	 that	management	 is	 displaced	 in	 a	 hostile	 takeover	 so	 as	 to	 protect	DCS	companies	from	opportunistic	acquirers.14			On	the	other	hand,	a	discount	to	investor	shares	with	inferior	voting	rights	in	a	DCS	structure	may	result	 in	 the	extraction	of	private	benefits	and	management	entrenchment.15	With	 few	 constraints	 placed	 upon	 them,	 managers	 holding	superior	class	stock	can	entrench	themselves	into	the	operations	of	the	company,	regardless	 of	 their	 abilities	 and	 performance.	 However,	 it	 is	 unclear	 as	 to	whether	those	risks	actually	lead	to	a	negative	impact	on	company	performance.			There	 is	 extensive	empirical	 evidence	documenting	 the	adoption	and	effects	of	DCS.	But	their	findings	are	contradictory	due	to	the	differing	approaches	taken	to	analyse	 the	 impacts	 of	 DCS.16	Some	 studies	 affirm	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 DCS																																																									10	Easterbrook	and	Fischel	(1991),	n	8,	73.	11	Mike	Burkart	and	Samuel	Lee,	‘One	Share-One	Vote:	The	Theory’	(2008)	12	Review	of	Finance	1,	40-41.	12	See	the	CCGG	Publication	on	Dual	Class	Share	Policy	in	September	2013,	available	at		<http://admin.yourwebdepartment.com/site/ccgg/assets/pdf/Dual_Class_Share_Policy.pdf>	accessed	8	December	2015.	13	Harry	DeAngelo	and	Linda	DeAngelo,	‘Managerial	Ownership	of	Voting	Rights:	A	Study	of	Public	Corporations	with	Dual	Classes	of	Common	Stock’	(1985)	14	Journal	of	Financial	
Economics	33;	and	Valentin	Dimitrov	and	Prem	Jain,	‘Recapitalization	of	One	Class	of	Common	Stock	into	Dual	Class:	Growth	and	Long-run	Stock	Returns’	(2006)	12	Journal	of	Corporate	
Finance	342.	14	Gregg	Jarrell	and	Annette	Poulsen,	‘Dual-class	Recapitalizations	as	Antitakeover	Mechanisms:	The	Recent	Evidence’	(1998)	20	Journal	of	Financial	Economics	129;	and	Van	Thuan	Nguyen	and	Li	Xu,	‘The	Impact	of	Dual	Class	Structure	on	Earnings	Management	Activities’	(2010)	37	Journal	
of	Business	Finance	and	Accountings	456,	457.	15	Richard	Ruback,	‘Coercive	Dual-Class	Exchange	Offers’	(1988)	20	Journal	of	Financial	
Economics	153;	Paul	Gompers	et	al,	‘Extreme	Governance:	An	Analysis	of	Dual-Class	Firms	in	the	United	States’	(2010)	23	Review	of	Financial	Studies	1051.	16	Some	studies	compare	different	companies	with	and	without	DCS	for	the	conclusion	that	DCS	structures	have	a	negative	effect	on	performance.	But	it	is	disagreed	by	studies	looking	at	the	performance	of	listed	companies	in	the	period	immediately	following	their	IPOs,	studies	of	companies	that	have	unified	a	DCS	structure,	or	studies	of	existing	listed	companies	moving	to	a	DCS	structure.	See	HKEx	(2014),	n	3,	IV	10.	
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structures	allow	the	extraction	of	private	benefits	and	increase	agency	costs	and	financial	 risks	 to	 non-controlling	 shareholders. 17 	They	 observe	 that	 DCS	structures	tend	to	underperform	single-class	structures,	reflecting	in	companies	with	stronger	shareholder	rights	having	higher	firm	value,	higher	profits,	higher	sales	growth	and	lower	capital	expenditures,	and	fewer	corporate	acquisitions.18			In	 contrast,	 another	 group	 of	 empirical	 studies,	 though	 inconclusive,	 obtain	opposite	 results	 that	 companies	 going	 public	 with	 DCS	 outperform	 their	counterparts	 in	 terms	 of	 stock	 returns	 and	 accounting	 performance.19	In	addition,	there	are	also	subtle	positive	effects	offered	by	DCS	in	some	ways.	DCS	may	 be	 desirable	 because	 they	 are	 most	 likely	 to	 encourage	 managerial	investment	 in	 firm-specific	human	capital	 and	higher	 tender	offers	when	 there	are	multiple	bidders	with	private	benefits	competing	for	control.20			More	recently,	one	stream	of	research	views	that	DCS	are	temporary	structures	kept	until	when	the	company	requires	new	capital	 for	expansion	and	growth.21		This	explains	why	a	reverse	trend	has	been	witnessed	in	continental	Europe	that	an	 increasing	 number	 of	 companies	 unify	 their	 shares	 into	 a	 single	 class	 in	 a	view	 to	 increasing	 firm’s	 market	 value	 and	 reducing	 the	 cost	 of	 new	 equity	financing.22																																																										17	Ronald	Masulis	et	al,	‘Agency	Problems	at	Dual-Class	Companies’	(2009)	64	Journal	of	Finance	1697	(arguing	that	management	are	likely	to	exercise	private	benefits	at	the	expense	of	outside	shareholders	in	DCS	companies).	And	Lucian	Bebchuk	et	al,	‘Stock	Pyramids,	Cross	Ownership,	and	Dual	Class	Equity:	The	Mechanisms	and	Agency	Costs	of	Separating	Control	from	Cash	Flow	Rights’	in	Randall	Morck	(ed.)	Concentrated	Corporate	Ownership	(Chicago:	The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2000),	295-96	(arguing	that	cash	flow	rights	or	equity	ownership	of	the	controlling	shareholder	declines,	the	agency	costs	to	non-	controlling	shareholders	tend	to	rise	at	an	alarming	rate).	18	Burgundy	Asset	Management	Ltd.,	‘Second	Class	Owners?’,	September	1996,		available	at	<http://www.burgundyasset.com/data/newsletter/1996_09_Second_Class_Owners.pdf>	accessed	23	October	2015	(finding	that	a	tendency	for	companies	with	DCS	to	underperform	in	Canada	but	the	performance	differential	is	small).	Paul	Gompers	et	al,	‘Corporate	Governance	and	Equity	Prices’		(2003)	118	Quarterly	Journal	of	Economics	107	(arguing	that	investors	that	bought	companies	with	strongest	rights	and	sold	companies	having	weakest	rights	would	have	earned	abnormal	returns	of	8.5	per	cent	per	year).		19	Ekkehart	Bohmer	et	al.	‘The	effect	of	consolidated	control	on	firm	performance:	the	case	of	dual-class	IPOs’	in	Mario	Levis	(ed.),	Empirical	Issues	in	Raising	Equity	Capital	(1996).	Amsterdam:	Elsevier,	95-124.	And	Valentin	Dimitrov	and	Prem	Jain,	‘Recapitalization	of	One	Class	of	Common	Stock	into	Dual-	Class:	Growth	and	Long-Run	Stock	Returns’	(2006)	12	Journal	
of	Corporate	Finance	342.	20	Harry	DeAngelo	and	Linda	DeAngelo,	1985.	‘Managerial	Ownership	of	Voting	Rights:	A	study	of	Public	Corporations	with	Dual	Classes	of	Common	Stock’	(1985)	14	Journal	of	Financial	
Economics	33,	62.	Mike	Burkart	et	al	1998.	‘Why	Higher	Takeover	Premia	Protect	Minority	Shareholders’	(1998)	106	Journal	of	Political	Economy	172	(arguing	that	higher	takeover	premia	induced	by	competition	translate	into	higher	ownership	concentration	and	are	thus	benefical).	21	Douglas	Ashton,	‘Revisiting	Dual-Class	Stock’	(1994)	68	St.	John’s	Law	Review	863,	871	(arguing	that	DCS	don’t	constitute	‘a	permanent	alteration	in	a	firm’s	ownership	structure’).	Ben	Amoako-Adu	and	Brian	Smith,	‘Dual	Class	Firms:	Capitalization,	Ownership	Structure	and	Recapitalization	Back	into	Single	Class’	(2001)	25	Journal	of	Banking	and	Finance	1083.	22	For	the	examination	of	DCS	unification	in	Europe,	see	Anete	Pajuste,	‘Determinants	and	Consequences	of	the	Unification	of	Dual-Class	Shares’	(2005)	European	Central	Bank	Working	Paper	Series	No.	465;	and	Benjanmin	Maury	and	Anete	Pajuste,	‘Private	Benefits	of	Control	and	Dual-Class	Share	Unifications’	(2011)	32	Managerial	and	Decision	Economics	355.	For	the	
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	Despite	 the	 debates,	 DCS	will	 likely	 persist	 and	 succeed	 in	 some	 jurisdictions.	There	 is	 some	 consensus	 that	 without	 the	 availability	 of	 DCS,	 founders	 and	entrepreneurs	would	be	reluctant	to	take	their	companies	public	due	to	the	fear	of	 losing	control.	 In	 the	 long	run,	 it	may	 lead	 to	a	curtailment	 in	 the	growth	of	new	 and	 emerging	 companies.	23	Some	proactivists	 even	 claim	 that	 there	 is	 no	social	need	to	constrain	the	choice	of	share	structure	because	companies	choose	DCS	will	only	do	so	if	the	benefits	outweigh	the	cost.24	But	more	realists	propose	that	 the	 centre	 of	 debate	 should	 be	 shifted	 to	 how	 the	 governance	 of	 DCS	companies	can	be	improved	so	as	to	minimise	the	added	agency	costs	while	still	maintaining	their	inherent	efficiencies	and	benefits.25		
	
III. Divided	Stances	of	Global	Financial	Centres		This	section	examines	the	regulatory	treatment	of	DCS	in	Top	5	global	financial	centres	which	have	developed	markets	for	trading	listed	securities.		
A. New	York		In	the	US	the	principle	of	one	share-one	vote	that	each	shareholder	is	entitled	to	only	one	vote	regardless	of	the	number	shares	owned	has	been	long	discarded	as	a	default	 rule	under	Delaware’s	 company	 law	but	 companies	 can	opt	 out	 from	it.26	The	NYSE	and	NASDAQ	permit	companies	with	pre-existing	DCS	structures																																																																																																																																																															unification	of	shares	in	individual	country,	see	Ingolf	Dittmann	and	Niels	Ulbricht,	‘Timing	and	Wealth	Effects	of	German	Dual	Class	Stock	Unifications’	(2007)	14	European	Financial	
Management	163;	and	Olaf	Ehrhardt	et	al	‘	Unification	of	Dual-Class	Shares	in	Germany:	Empirical	Evidence	on	the	Effects	of	Related	Changes	in	Ownership	Structure,	market	Value,	and	Bid-Ask	Spreads’	(2005)	Swiss	Finance	Institute	research	paper	series	No.06-12.	Both	discuss	the	decisions	of	German	DCS	companies	to	consolidate	their	share	structure	from	dual	to	single	class.	For	other	jurisdictions	such	as	Brazil	and	the	US,	see	Gabriela	Engler,	‘Why	They	Persist?	An	Analysis	of	Dual	Class	Structures	and	the	Unification	Process	in	the	US	and	Brazil’	(2014)	10	
Revista	Direito	GV	23.	23	Tara	Gry,	‘Dual	Class	Share	Structures	and	Best	Practices	in	Corporate	Governance’	(2005)	Library	of	Parliament,	2,	online:	Parliamentary	Information	and	research	Service		<http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/prb0526-e.pdf>	accessed	23	October	2015.	And	Daniel	Cipollone	(2012),	69.	24	Kristian	Rydqvist,	‘Dual-Class	Shares:	A	Review’	(1992)	8	Oxford	Review	of	Economic	Policy	45.	25	Chun-Keung	Hoi	and	Ashok	Robin,	‘Agency	Conflicts,	Controlling	Owner	Proximity,	and	Firm	Value:	An	Analysis	of	Dual-Class	Firms	in	the	United	States’	(2010)	18	Corporate	Governance:	An	
International	Review	124	(suggesting	that	dual-class	companies	must	seek	additional	control	mechanisms	to	curb	agency	costs	though	controller	proximity	is	unrelated	to	firm	value).	Daniel	Cipollone,	‘Risky	Business:	A	Review	of	Dual	Class	Share	Structure	in	Canada	and	a	Proposal	for	Reform’	(2012)	21	Dalhousie	Journal	of	Legal	Studies	62,	91.		26	Delaware	General	Corporation	Law	Section	212(a)	states:	‘Unless	otherwise	provided	in	the	certificate	of	incorporation...each	stockholder	shall	be	entitled	to	1	vote	for	each	share	of	capital	stock	held	by	such	stockholder.’	For	the	general	discussion	on	the	‘one	share,	one	vote’	rule,	see	Chester	Rohrlich,	‘Corporate	Voting:	Majority	Control’	(1933),	7(2)	St.	John's	Law	Review	218		(noting	the	trend	away	from	the	strict	rule	of	equal	voting	rights);	Earl	Sneed,	‘The	Stockholder	May	Vote	as	He	Pleases:	Theory	and	Fact’	(1961)	22	University	of	Pittsburgh	Law	Review	23,	23-24	(noting	that	the	policy	of	voting	equality	was	comparatively	short-lived);	David	Ratner,	‘The	Government	of	Business	Corporations:	Critical	Reflections	on	the	Rule	of	"One	Share,	One	Vote"’	
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to	 list	on	their	markets,	but	do	not	allow	an	 issuer,	once	 listed,	 to	 implement	a	DCS	structure	that	would	discriminate	the	interests	of	existing	shareholders.27			The	unbundling	of	cash	flow	and	voting	rights	in	the	US	dates	back	to	1925	when	a	 few	 leading	 companies	 such	 as	 Dodge	 Brothers	 issued	 non-voting	 common	stocks. 28 	In	 response	 to	 the	 resulting	 public	 outcry,	 in	 1926	 the	 NYSE	disapproved	an	issue	of	nonvoting	common	stock	by	releasing	a	statement	that	it	would	 review	 the	matter	 of	 voting	 control	 carefully.29	After	 the	 statement,	 the	NYSE	 prohibited	 the	 issuance	 of	 non-voting	 securities,	 although	 it	 did	 not	formally	 announce	 the	prohibition	until	 1940.30	As	 to	why	 the	 it	 opposed	 such	voting	 rights,	 the	 NYSE	 Listed	 Company	 Manual	 states,	 ‘[C]onsistent	 with	 the	Exchange's	long-standing	commitment	to	encourage	high	standards	of	corporate	democracy,	every	listed	company	is	expected	to	follow	certain	practices	aimed	at	maintaining	 appropriate	 standards	 of	 corporate	 responsibility,	 integrity	 and	accountability	to	shareholders.’31		While	 the	 NYSE	 keep	 restraint,32	the	 other	 two	 national	 securities	 exchanges	such	 as	 the	 American	 Stock	 Exchange	 (AMEX)	 and	 the	National	 Association	 of	Securities	Dealers	(NASD),	with	which	the	NYSE	competed,	had	a	similar	but	less	rigorous	 prohibition	 respecting	 voting	 provisions	 for	 common	 stock.33	As	 DCS																																																																																																																																																															(1970),	56	Cornell	Law	Review	1,	3-11	(generally	outlining	the	development	of	the	one	share,	one	vote	rule).	27	NYSE	Listed	Company	Manual,	Rule	313(A)	and	NASDAQ	Stock	Market	Rule	5640.	28	Dodge	sold	a	total	of	US$130	million	worth	of	bonds,	preferred	stock	and	nonvoting	common	shares	to	the	public.	Dodge	was	controlled,	however,	by	an	investment	banking	firm,	which	had	paid	only	US$2.25	million	for	its	voting	common	stock.	29	The	NYSE	released	an	announcement	in	January	1926:	‘Without	at	this	time	attempting	to	formulate	a	definite	policy,	attention	should	be	drawn	to	the	fact	that	in	the	future	the	[listing]	committee,	in	considering	applications	for	the	listing	of	securities,	will	give	careful	thought	to	the	matter	of	voting	control.’	See	Joel	Seligman,	‘Equal	Protection	in	Shareholder	Voting	Right	The	One	Common	Share,	One	Vote	Controversy’	(1986),	54	George	Washington	Law	Review	687,	694-97.	30	In	May	1940,	the	NYSE	formally	announced	an	official	rule	entitled	‘Statement	of	Listing	Requirements	as	to	Preferred	Stock	Voting	Rights’	against	such	listings.	See	Richard	Jennings,	‘The	Role	of	the	States	in	Corporate	Regulation	and	Investor	Protection’	(1958),	23(2)	Law	and	
Contemporary	Problems	193,	228	(arguing	that	such	statement	provides	standards	of	fairness	to	prevent	inequitable	arrangements	in	multi-securities	structures).	And	S	Robbins,	‘An	Evaluation	of	the	New	York	Stock	Exchange	Listing	Policy	on	Voting’	(1978),	New	York	Stock	Exchange	Study,	183	(stating	that	this	apparently	was	‘the	first	formal	published	enunciation	that	the	Exchange	would	refuse	to	list	non-voting	common	stock’.	31	New	York	Stock	Exchanges	Listed	Company	Manual	(1983)	Section	3	para.	301.	For	a	full	discussion	on	this	rule,	see	Seligman	(1986),	n	29.	32	The	NYSE	allowed	a	few	exceptions	such	as	Ford	Motor	Company	which	was	able	to	get	around	the	prohibition	by	issuing	a	class	with	inferior	voting	rights	rather	than	no	voting	rights.	See	Jason	Howell,	‘The	Survival	of	the	US	Dual	Class	Share	Structure’	(2014),	Journal	of	Corporate	
Finance	1,	5.	But	the	DCS	of	the	Ford	Motor	Company	were	opposed	by	some	institutions	and	blockholders	who	attempt	to	eliminate	the	structure	and	move	to	one	vote	per	share.	See	Ford	Motor	Company,	5	April	2007	Form	DEF	14A,	at	<http://yahoo.brand.edgar-online.com/Default.aspx?companyid=3404&formtypeID=148>	accessed	30	July	2015.	33	See	American	Stock	Exchange,	Company	Guide	(1983)	§§	101-17.	The	AMEX	did	not	implement	a	nonvoting	prohibition	until	1972,	and	AMEX	standards	for	listing	corporate	securities	are	similar	to	NYSE,	but	less	rigorous.	See	Jason	Howell,	‘The	Survival	of	the	US	Dual	Class	Share	Structure’	(2014),	Journal	of	Corporate	Finance1,	5.		And	Seligman	(1986),	691-92	(discussing	AMEX	and	NASD’s	restrictions	on	common	stock	voting	rights).		
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became	 more	 common,	 a	 view	 expressed	 by	 Gilson	 emerged:	 instead	 of	 the	banning	 of	 DCS,	 the	 focus	 became	 dual	 class	 recapitalisations	 where	 existing	shareholders	 effectively	 coerced	 into	 giving	 up	 their	 voting	 rights.34	This	approach	 would	 allow	 companies	 to	 enjoy	 the	 benefits	 of	 DCS	 without	 the	problem	of	coerced	shareholders.	This	new	approach	led	to	the	proposal	of	rule	19C-4	 by	 the	 SEC	 on	 7	 July	 1988.	 Under	 the	 rule,	 the	 SEC	 prohibited	 self-regulatory	organisations	from	listing	and	trading	the	stocks	of	any	company	that	issued	 new	 shares	 carrying	 more	 than	 one	 vote	 per	 share,	 but	 it	 allowed	companies	to	issue	shares	with	less	than	one	vote	per	share	and	permitted	those	with	unequal	voting	rights	to	still	be	traded.35			In	 the	 view	 of	 Bainbridge,	 the	 SEC’s	 stance	 to	 object	 the	 strict	 one-share/one-vote	standard	rested	on	the	basic	ground	that	the	various	theoretical	arguments	in	favour	of	a	flat	prohibition	were	unpersuaded,	and	the	side	effects	of	DCS	on	shareholder	 wealth	 were	 unclear	 and	 inconclusive.36	Although	 rule	 19C-4	 is	 a	useful	starting	point	in	determining	which	types	of	DCS	require	regulation,	 it	 is	not	a	sound	model	for	Self-Regulatory	Organisation	(SRO)	rulemaking	due	to	its	inconsistency	with	 general	 corporate	 law	 principles	 and	 uncertainty	 as	 to	 the	rule’s	effect	on	other	types	of	corporate	transactions.37	Furthermore,	there	was	a	debate	over	whether	the	SEC	had	the	legal	authority	to	enforce	such	policies	on	self-regulating	stock	exchanges.	On	12	June	1990,	a	three-judge	panel	of	the	US	Court	of	Appeals	for	the	District	of	Columbia	Circuit	unanimously	ruled	that	the	SEC	had	exceeded	it's	the	statutory	authority	delegated	by	the	Congress.38			Despite	the	court’s	rejection	of	the	19C-4	rule,	the	NASD	and	the	AMEX	joined	the	NYSE	 to	 implement	 19C-4	 by	 allowing	 companies	 to	 introduce	 inferior	 voting	shares	 in	 IPOs	 but	 barring	 them	 from	 reducing	 existing	 shareholders’	 voting	rights	through	actions	as	‘the	adoption	of	time	phased	voting	plans,	the	adoption	of	capped	voting	rights	plans,	the	issuance	of	super	voting	stock	or	the	issuance	of	 stock	with	voting	 rights	 less	 than	 the	per	 share	voting	 rights	of	 the	existing	common	stock	through	an	exchange	offer’.39			In	spite	of	the	regulatory	efforts	to	develop	a	uniform	policy	on	DCS	in	all	the	US	markets,	the	adoption	of	DCS	still	receives	criticism.	For	instance,	in	2004	when																																																									34	Ronald	Gilson,	‘Evaluating	Dual	Class	Common	Stock:	The	Relevance	of	Substitutes’	(1987)	73	
Virginia	Law	Review	807.	35	The	new	listing	standards	created	by	rule	19C-4	prohibited	a	covered	exchange	from	listing	or	continuing	to	list	the	equity	securities	of	an	issuer	that	takes	one	of	the	prohibited	actions.	It	likewise	prohibited	a	covered	securities	association	from	authorizing	the	equity	securities	of	such	an	issuer	for	quotation	and/or	transaction	reporting	on	an	automated	quotation	system.	The	Inter-	mountain	and	Spokane	Stock	Exchanges	were	the	only	national	securities	exchanges	excluded	from	coverage.	The	NASD	was	the	only	securities	association	affected	by	the	rule,	just	as	the	NASDAQ	system	was	the	only	affected	automated	quotation	system.	Finally,	only	those	issuers	registered	with	the	SEC	pursuant	to	Exchange	Act	section	12,	15	US.C.	Section	781	(1988),	were	covered	by	the	rule.	Exchange	Act	Release	No.	25891	(July	7,	1988).	See	Stephen	Bainbridge,	‘The	Short	Life	and	Resurrection	of	SEC	Rule	19C-4’	(1991),	69	Washington	University	
Law	Review	565,	566-67.	36	Bainbridge	(1991),	n	35,	578.	37	Ibid,	628.	38	Business	Roundtable	v.	SEC,	905	F.2d	406	(D.C.	Cir.	1990).	39	Section	313.00	of	the	NYSE	Listed	Company	Manual.	
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Google	 went	 public	 with	 a	 DCS	 structure	 on	 NASDAQ,40	the	 influential	 proxy	adviser,	Institutional	Shareholder	Services	(ISS)	ranking	Google	near	the	bottom	of	its	corporate	governance	rankings,	below	any	company	in	the	S&P	500	stock	index.41			Despite	controversies,	DCS	remain	a	growing	part	of	the	US	scene.	 	 In	2012,	79	out	 of	 114	 controlled	 companies	 in	 the	 S&P	 1500	 Composite	 posed	 DCS	 with	disproportionate	voting	shares.42	Studies	have	shown	that	companies	are	more	likely	 to	 adopt	DCS,	 especially	 in	 the	American	 context,	 in	 the	 three	 scenarios:	first,	 when	 the	 company	 operates	 in	 industries	 with	 a	 substantial	 increase	 in	takeover	activity;	second,	when	management	reputation	has	increased,	because	of	 good	 past	 performance	 or	 reputable	 new	 management;	 third,	 when	 the	company	drastically	changes	features,	affecting	its	product	market	(e.g.	relevant	change	 in	 technology	 or	 entrance	 into	 a	 new	 market),	 requiring	 it	 to	 make	decisions	 on	 risky	 long-term	 investment	 without	 guarantee	 of	 success	 in	 the	short-run.43			The	consequences	of	having	a	DCS	structure	have	been	reported	by	many.	Adams	and	 Ferreira	 review	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 empirical	 studies,	 and	 conclude	 that	evidence	 on	 the	 value	 of	 the	 control	 premium	 strongly	 collaborates	 the	hypothesis	that	sizeable	private	benefits	exist,	and	that	controlling	shareholders	enjoy	 private	 benefits	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 non-controlling	 shareholders. 44	However,	the	risks	of	entrenchment	and	private	benefits	may	be	outweighed	by	positive	 consequences	 of	 DCS,	 for	 example,	 greater	 capital	 structure	 flexibility	and	long-term	returns.45	Furthermore,	The	US	legal	and	institutional	frameworks	also	help	minimise	the	negative	effects	of	DCS	by	the	dominance	of	professional	investors,	 and	 a	 disclosure-based	 regime	by	 imposing	much	 stricter	 disclosure	
																																																								40	Google’s	dual	class	IPO	had	class	A	shares	(with	one	vote	per	share),	which	were	sold	to	outsiders	in	the	IPO;	it	also	had	class	B	shares	(with	ten	votes	per	share),	which	were	retained	by	the	founders,	Larry	Page	and	Sergey	Brin,	as	well	as	other	insiders.	See	Google’s	website,	‘2004	Founders’	IPO	Letter’,	at		<https://investor.google.com/corporate/2004/ipo-founders-letter.html>	accessed	30	July	2015.	41	Kevin	Delaney	and	Ann	Grimes,	‘For	Some	Who	Passed	on	Google	Long	Ago,	Wistful	Thinking’	(Wall	Street	Journal,	23	August	2004),	(which	quotes	ISS	special	counsel	Patrick	McGurn:	‘Because	Google	lacks	the	usual	checks	and	balances	provided	at	public	companies	by	shareholder	votes,	holders	must	closely	scrutinize	the	judgement	of	the	company’s	top	decision	makers.	Rank-and-file	shareholders	have	no	meaningful	avenue	for	recourse	–	other	than	selling	their	low-vote	shares,	of	course	–	if	the	company	loses	its	way.’)	42	Investor	Responsibility	Research	Centre	Institute	(IRRCI),	‘Controlled	Companies	in	the	Standard	&	Poor’s	1500:	A	Ten	Year	Performance	and	Risk	Review’	(2012),	at		<http://irrcinstitute.org/pdf/FINAL-Controlled-Company-ISS-Report.pdf>	accessed	31	July	2015.	43	Thomas	Chemmanur	and	Yawen	Jiao,	‘Dual	Class	IPOs,	Share	Recapitalisaitons,	and	Unifications:	A	Theoretical	Analysis’	(2006)	European	Corporate	Governance	Institute	(ECGI)	-	Finance	Research	Paper	Series,	7.	44	Renee	Adams	and	Daniel	Ferreira,	‘One	Share-One	Vote:	The	Empirical	Evidence’	(2008)	12	
Review	of	Finance	51,	79.	45	Scott	Bauguess	et	al,	‘Large	Shareholder	Diversification,	Corporate	Risk	Taking,	and	the	Benefits	of	Changing	to	Differential	Voting	Rights’	(2012)	36	Journal	of	Banking	&	Finance	1244.	
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standards	and	taking	active	enforcement	actions	against	market	abuse	as	well	as	a	litigious	culture.46				
B. London		The	 concept	 of	 one	 share-one	 vote	 is	 also	 the	 default	 position	 under	 the	 UK	Companies	 Act	 2006,	 but	 subject	 to	 any	 provision	 of	 the	 company’s	 articles.47	The	 Premium	 Listing	 Principles	 set	 out	 in	 Listing	 Rule	 7.2.1AR	 apply	 to	 every	company	with	a	premium	listing	of	their	equity	shares.48	Under	Premium	Listing	Principle	5,	a	 listed	company	must	ensure	 that	 it	 treats	all	holders	of	 the	same	class	of	premium	listed	shares	equally	in	respect	of	the	rights	attaching	to	such	listed	equity	shares	except	where	holders	are	in	a	different	position.		On	 2	 October	 2012,	 the	 Financial	 Conduct	 Authority	 (FCA)	 launched	 a	consultation	 (CP12/25)	 on	 ‘Enhancing	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 Listing	Regime’,	largely	 in	 response	 to	 market	 pressure	 to	 improve	 protections	 for	 minority	shareholders	 in	 premium-listed	 issuers	 with	 controlling	 shareholders. 49	Following	on	 from	CP12/25,	 the	paper	 (CP13/15)	was	published	 in	November	2013	to	propose	to	amend	the	way	that	the	listing	principles	are	applied	to	listed	companies.50	One	 year	 later,	 the	 FCA	 published	 the	 final	 rules	 (PS14/8)	regarding	the	two	consultations,	which	came	into	force	on	16	May	2014	subject	to	some	transitional	provisions.51		As	 proposed	 in	 CP13/15,	 two	 additional	 Premium	 Listing	 Principles,	representing	a	‘basic	norm	of	behaviour	for	any	company	wishing	to	raise	capital	in	a	public	market’,	now	apply	to	premium-listed	issuers	as	follows.52		
• Premium	 Listing	 Principle	 3:	 all	 shares	 in	 a	 premium-listed	 share	 class	must	carry	an	equal	number	of	votes	on	any	shareholder	vote;	and																																																									46	Raymond	Siu	Yeung	Chan	and	John	Kong	Shan	Ho,	‘Should	Listed	Companies	be	Allowed	to	Adopt	Dual-Class	Share	Structure	in	Hong	Kong?’	(2014)	43	Common	Law	World	Review	155,	174-179.	47	Section	284	of	the	UK	Companies	Act	2006.	48	See	the	website	of	the	Financial	Conduct	Authority	(FCA),	at	<https://fshandbook.info/FS/html/handbook/LR/7/2>	accessed	31	July	2015.	49	For	the	full	text,	at	<https://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/consultation-papers/fsa-cp1225>	accessed	3	August	2015.	50	CP13/15	covers	feedback	to	CP12/25,	near-final	rules	based	on	the	original	proposal;	consultation	on	the	revised	or	new	proposals	as	a	result	of	feedback	received,	and	the	associated	draft	rules.	See	FSA,	‘CP13/15:	Feedback	on	CP12/25:	Enhancing	the	effectiveness	of	the	Listing	Regime	and	Further	Consultation’	(2013),	at	<https://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/consultation-papers/cp13-15.pdf>	accessed	3	August	2015.	51	FCA,	‘PS14/8:	Response	to	CP13/15	–	Enhancing	the	effectiveness	of	the	Listing	Regime’	(2015),	at<	https://www.fca.org.uk/news/ps14-08-enhancing-the-effectiveness-of-the-listing-regime>	accessed	3	August	2015.	52	Linklaters,	‘Latest	FCA	Proposals:	Enhancing	the	Effectiveness	of	the	Listing	Regime’,	November	2013,	16,	at		<www.linklaters.com/.../A17407415_v0.0_Linklaters_Briefing_FCA_CP13_	15.pdf>	accessed	3	August	2015.	
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• Premium	 Listing	 Principle	 4:	 the	 aggregate	 voting	 rights	 of	 different	premium-listed	 share	 classes	 should	 be	 broadly	 proportionate	 to	 their	relative	 interests	 in	 the	 company’s	 equity	 (taking	 into	 account	 the	commercial	 rationale	 for	 the	 differences	 in	 the	 rights	 and	 the	 extent	 of	dispersion	and	relative	liquidity	of	the	classes).53		In	PS14/8,	the	FCA	clarifies	that	the	purpose	of	the	new	principles	is	to	prevent	artificial	 structures	 involving	 multiple	 classes	 with	 different	 voting	 powers,	which	are	designed	to	allow	a	small	group	of	shareholders	to	exercise	control.54	However,	the	FCA	acknowledges	that	different	share	classes	may	also	be	used	for	other	purposes,	 for	 example,	 closed-ended	 investment	 funds	use	 them	 to	meet	the	differing	investment	needs	of	investors.	The	new	rules	are	believed	to	tighten	the	UK	listing	regime	for	premium	listed	companies	and	ensure	the	overarching	framework	 of	 best	 corporate	 governance	 practices,	 although	 it	 remains	 to	 be	seen	how	it	will	work	in	practice.55			After	Alibaba	was	denied	listing	by	Hong	Kong	on	corporate	structure	concerns,	a	 debate	 over	whether	 the	 LSE	 changes	 listing	 rules	 to	 secure	 the	 high-profile	listing	 has	 been	 brought	 up.	 Some	 market	 optimists	 criticise	 the	 LSE’s	inflexibility	in	corporate	governance	may	affect	its	ability	to	attract	big	IPOs,	and	argue	 that	 the	 UK	 Corporate	 Governance	 Code	 to	 which	 premium	 listed	companies	 adhere	 through	 a	 ‘comply	 or	 explain’	 regime	 may	 provide	 a	possibility	 for	 a	 DCS	 company	 to	 list	 in	 London.56	However,	 both	 the	 FCA	 and	institutional	 investors	 oppose	 to	 change	 rules	 and	 keep	 a	 firm	 stance	 on	 the	principle	of	one	share-one	vote	to	protect	shareholders’	interests.57		Until	now,	DCS	are	still	rare	among	British	listed	companies,	though	the	UK	has	one	of	the	most	liberal	regimes	in	this	regard.	What	makes	the	UK	different	from	the	 US	 in	 light	 of	 DCS:	 one	 is	 the	 superpower	 of	 institutional	 investors	 who	
																																																								53	FCA	(2013),	Appendix	X	of	CP13/15,	16.		54	FCA	(2015),	PS14/8,	para.	5.21-5.22,	31.	55	James	Healy	et	at,	‘FCA	Listing	Rule	Changes	Applicable	to	Premium	Listed	Companies’,	Skadden,	Arps,	Slate,	Meagher	&	Flom	LLP,	8	May	2014,	at		<https://www.skadden.com/insights/fca-listing-rule-changes-applicable-premium-listed-companies>	accessed	4	August	2015.	56	For	example,	James	Lyons,	‘Alibaba	vs	Corporate	Governance:	Rules	for	Listing	around	the	World’,	7	November	2013,	at	<http://www.growthbusiness.co.uk/growing-a-business/company-flotations/2430487/alibaba-vs-corporate-governance-rules-for-listing-around-the-world.thtml>	accessed	4	August	2015.	57	Enoch	Yiu,	‘British	Regulator	Backs	Hong	Kong	Stance	on	Alibaba	IPO’	(South	China	Morning	
Post,	20	March	2014),	at	<http://www.scmp.com/business/money/markets-investing/article/1452681/british-regulator-backs-hong-kong-stance-alibaba>	accessed	4	August	2015.	Also,	a	letter	from	the	Council	of	Institutional	Investors	(CII)	in	response	to	Alibaba	listing	requested	LSE	to	resist	any	pressure	to	change	the	listing	standards	to	deviate	from	the	principle	of	one	share,	one	vote.	See	CII,	‘CII	Letter	to	the	London	Stock	Exchange	on	One	Share,	One	Vote’,	27	March	2014,	at	<www.cii.org/.../03_27_14_CII_letter_to_london_stock_exchange_one_share	_one_vote.pdf>	accessed	4	August	2015.	
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strongly	support	the	one	vote	per	share	rule;58	the	other	is	the	breakthrough	rule	which	is	‘a	threat’	to	DCS.59		DCS	 are	 unpopular	 in	 the	 UK	 owing	 to	 market	 pressure	 and	 successful	opposition	 from	 institutional	 investors.60		 The	 proportion	 of	 shares	 owned	 by	intuitional	investors	in	the	UK	companies	dramatically	rose	over	the	1960s	and	1970	 simultaneously	 with	 the	 emergence	 of	 multiple	 class	 share	 structures.61	The	 institutional	 investors,	 having	 a	 significant	proportion	of	 the	 shares	 in	 the	UK	 market,	 have	 incentives	 to	 promote	 good	 governance	 by	 reducing	 the	number	of	multiple	class	shares	or	non-voting	shares.62	As	a	consequence,	listed	companies	 on	 the	 LSE	 rarely	 employ	 derivations	 from	 the	 one	 share-one	 vote	rule	until	today.63		In	addition,	the	breakthrough	rule	is	another	reason	why	DCS	are	unflavoured	in	the	 UK.	 The	 breakthrough	 rule	 was	 adopted	 in	 the	 Takeover	 Bids	 Directive64	with	 a	 view	 to	 eliminating	 certain	 pre-bid	 defences	 to	 takeovers.	 This	 rule	enables	a	bidder	who	has	accumulated	75	percentage	of	equity	to	break	through	the	 company’s	 existing	 voting	 arrangements	 and	 exercise	 control	 as	 if	 the	 one	share-one	 vote	 principle	 is	 upheld.	 Therefore,	 many	 observers	 have	 seen	 the	breakthrough	 rule	 as	 an	 attack	 on	 controlling	 owners	 in	 DCS	 companies.65	Established	DCS	would	be	undone	or	at	least	lose	much	of	their	significance.																																																										58	Wolf-Georg	Ringe,	“Deviations	from	Ownership-Control	Proportionality—Economic	Protectionism	Revisited”	in	Ulf	Bernitz	and	Wof-Georg	Ringe	(eds)	Company	Law	and	Economic	
Protection	(OUP	2010),	228.	59	Lucian	Bebchuk	and	Oliver	Hart,	‘A	Threat	to	Dual-Class	Shares’,	Financial	Times,	31	May	2002.	60	Kritian	Rydqvist,‘Dual	Class	Shares:	A	Review’	(1992)	8(3)	Oxford	Review	of		Economic	Policy	45,	47;	Brian	Cheffins,	Corporate	Ownership	and	Control—British	Business	Transformed	(OUP	2008),	32.	Paul	Davies,	‘Institutional	Investors	in	the	United	Kingdom’,	in	Daniel	Prentice	and	Peter	Holland	(eds.),	Contemporary	Issues	in	Corporate	Governance	(Oxford	1993),	85-87.	61	Ringe	(2010),	228.	Also,	see	Brian	Cheffins,	‘Law,	Economics	and	the	UK’s	System	of	Corporate	Governance:	Lessons	from	History’	(2001)	1	Journal	of	Corporate	Law	Studies	71,	82;	Andrew	Johnston,	‘Takeover	Regulation:	Historical	and	Theoretical	Perspectives	on	the	City	Code’	(2007)	66	Cambridge	Law	Journal	422,	426.	Taxes	imposed	on	corporate	profits,	taxation	of	managerial	and	investment	income	and	inheritance	taxes	drive	investors	to	permit	ownership	to	separate	from	control.	See	Steven	Bank	and	Brian	Cheffins,	‘Corporate	Ownership	and	Control	in	the	UK:	The	Tax	Dimension’	(2007)	70	Modern	Law	Review	778.	62	Bernard	Black	and	John	Coffee,	‘Hail	Britannia?	Institutional	Investor	Behavior	Under	Limited	Regulation’	(1994),	92(7)	Michigan	Law	Review	1997,	2034;	Cheffins	(OUP	2008),	31;	and	John	Armour	and	David	Skeel,	‘Who	Writes	the	Rules	for	Hostile	Takeovers,	and	Why?—The	Peculiar	Divergence	of	U.S.	and	U.K.	Takeover	Regulation’	(2007)	95	Georgetown	Law	Journal	1727,	1736.	63	Amongst	the	companies	examined	by	the	Shearman	&	Sterling	Study,	only	5%	had	multiple	voting	rights	in	place.	There	were	no	non-voting	shares	at	all.	See	Shearman	&	Sterling	LLP,	‘Proportionality	between	Ownership	and	Control	in	EU	Listed	Companies:	Comparative	Legal	Study’	(2007),	12,	at	<http://www.ecgi.org/osov/documents/study_report_en.pdf>	accessed	31	July	2017.	In	another	report	by	Shearman	&	Sterling	LLP,	BP	was	the	only	company	featuring	multiple	voting	rights	in	the	sample	of	66	listed	companies.	But	its	ordinary	shares	were	about	99.7%	of	the	total	outstanding	capital.	See	Shearman	&	Sterling	LLP,	‘Report	on	the	Proportionality	Principle	in	the	European	Union’	(2006),	at		<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/shareholders/study/final_report_en.pdf>	accessed	31	July	2015.	64	Art	11	of	The	Takeover	Directive	2004/25/EC.	65	Mara	Faccio	and	Larry	Lang,	‘The	Ultimate	Ownership	of	Western	European	Corporations’	(2002)	65	Journal	of	Financial	Economics	365;	and	Morten	Bennedsen	and	Kasper	Meisner	
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C. Hong	Kong		As	a	former	British	colony,	Hong	Kong’s	corporate	and	financial	regime	is	largely	inherited	 from	 the	 British	 system.66	As	 a	 result,	 Hong	 Kong’s	 rules	 are	 very	similar	to	those	in	the	UK	where	DCS	have	been	systematically	discouraged.	The	Hong	Kong	Companies	Ordinance	 (Cap	 622)	 allows	 a	Hong	Kong	 incorporated	company	to	provide,	in	its	articles,	for	the	issue	of	multiple	classes	of	shares	with	different	 voting	 rights.67	However,	 such	 company	 is	 prohibited	 by	 the	 HKEx,	regardless	of	pre-	and	post-listing,	 in	order	to	provide	fair	and	equal	treatment	to	all	shareholders.68	The	prohibition	is	set	out	in	the	Main	Board	Rule	8.11	(GEM	Rule	11.25	for	its	junior	bourse).		The	Listing	Rule	8.11	uses	the	wording	of	the	1983	NYSE	Listed	Company	Manual	 and	 states	 that	 the	 share	 capital	 of	 a	 new	applicant	must	not	include	shares	of	which	the	proposed	voting	power	does	not	bear	a	‘reasonable	relationship	to	the	equity	interest’	of	such	shares.69			The	term	of	‘voting	powers	‘	in	the	Listing	Rule	is	interpreted	to	be	intended	to	restrict	 all	 DCS	 structures,	 including	 those	 that	 give	 enhanced	 or	 exclusive	director	 election	 rights,	 and	 those	 that	 achieve	 the	 same	 effect	 by	 embedding	such	 rights	 in	 the	 company’s	 articles	 rather	 than	 by	 creating	 two	 classes	 of																																																																																																																																																															Nielsen,	‘The	Impact	of	a	Break-Through	Rule	on	European	Firms’	(2004)	17	European	Journal	of	
Law	and	Economics	259,	260.	66	The	Hong	Kong	law	always	follows	the	footsteps	of	the	UK	law.	For	example,	the	genesis	of	the	current	framework	is	the	Hong	Kong	Companies	Ordinance	of	1865	that	has	mirrored	the	English	Companies	Act	of	1862.	Likewise,	the	UK	Companies	Act	1908	was	followed	by	the	Hong	Kong	Companies	Ordinance	1911.	The	Hong	Kong	Companies	Ordinance	(CO)	was	designated	as	Chapter	(Cap)	32	in	1933	and	no	significant	legislative	initiative	in	company	law	was	introduced	until	1984,	which	reflected	the	UK	Companies	Act	1948.	See	Horace	Yeung	and	Flora	Huang,	‘Law	and	Finance:	What	Matters?	Hong	Kong	as	a	Test	Case’	(2012),	3(1)	Asian	Journal	of	Law	and	
Economics	1,	9.	Again,	the	Hong	Kong	Companies	Act	2014	codifies	directors’	duties	under	section	465	which	is	based	on	section	174	of	the	UK	Companies	Act	2006.	See	Kong	Shan	Ho,	‘Codification	of	Directors’	Duty	of	Care	and	Skill	in	Hong	Kong:	A	Welcome	Clarification	of	the	Law’,	working	paper,	at	<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2618143>	accessed	3	August	2015.	67	Companies	Ordinance	(Cap	622),	section	588(4)	and	section	50(4)	of	the	Companies	(Model	Articles)	Notice.	68	Fair	and	equal	treatment	to	all	shareholders	is	a	fundamental	principle	of	Hong	Kong’s	Listing	Rules.	Main	Board	Rule	2.03(4)	(GEM	Rule	2.06(4))	provides	that:	‘The	Listing	Rules	reflect	currently	acceptable	standards	in	the	market	place	and	are	designed	to	ensure	that	investors	have	and	can	maintain	confidence	in	the	market	and	in	particular	that:....	All	holders	of	listed	securities	are	treated	fairly	and	equally’.	69	NYSE	Listed	Company	Manual	§	3	(1983)	rule	313.00(D),	and	the	HKEx	Main	Board	Rule	8.11	provides	that	‘the	share	capital	of	a	new	applicant	must	not	include	shares	of	which	the	proposed	voting	power	does	not	bear	a	reasonable	relationship	to	the	equity	interest	of	such	shares	when	fully	paid	(“B	Shares”).	The	Exchange	will	not	be	prepared	to	list	any	new	B	Shares	issued	by	a	listed	issuer	nor	to	allow	any	new	B	Shares	to	be	issued	by	a	listed	issuer	(whether	or	not	listing	for	such	shares	is	to	be	sought	on	the	Exchange	or	any	other	stock	exchange	except	(1)	in	exceptional	circumstances	agreed	with	the	Exchange;	or	(2)	in	the	case	of	those	listed	companies	which	already	have	B	Shares	in	issue,	in	respect	of	further	issues	of	B	Shares	identical	in	all	respects	with	those	B	Shares	by	way	of	scrip	dividend	or	capitalisation	issue,	provided	that	the	total	number	of	B	Shares	in	issue	remains	substantially	in	the	same	proportion	to	the	total	number	of	other	voting	shares	in	issue	as	before	such	further	issue’.	
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shares.70	The	Rule	entitles	the	HKEx	to	approve	the	listing	of	DCS	companies	on	a	case-by-case	 basis	 in	 exceptional	 circumstances,71	however,	 none	 of	 the	 DCS	companies	has	been	admitted	by	the	HKEx	under	such	exception.72		The	Listing	Rule	8.11	has	remained	unaltered	for	more	than	two	decades	since	its	 introduction	for	the	sake	of	market	 integrity.73	However,	 the	HKEx	has	been	recently	 under	 pressure	 to	 change	 Rule	 8.11	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 rejection	 of	Alibaba’s	 listing	 plan	 which	 caused	 the	 loss	 of	 US$300	 million	 in	 anticipated	advisory	 fees	 for	Hong	Kong’s	 financial	 community	and	consequently	 the	harm	on	 its	 trading	 volumes	 and	 prestige.74	In	 order	 to	 attract	 Chinese	 technology	companies,	 the	 108-page	 Concept	 Paper	 was	 published	 by	 the	 HKEx	 on	 29	August	2014	to	seek	public	views	about	DCS.75	The	Concept	Paper	is	intended	to	evaluate	the	debate	on	whether	DCS	companies	should	be	allowed	to	list.	If	there	were	enough	support,	this	would	be	followed	by	a	formal	public	consultation	on	changes	 to	 local	 stock	 market	 regulations.	 The	 Concept	 Paper	 considered	 the	principles	 of	 investor	 protection,	 the	 current	 regulatory	 framework,	 the	competitiveness	of	Hong	Kong	as	one	of	the	world’s	top	listing	venues	as	well	as	other	jurisdictional	practices	on	DCS.			Having	reviewed	all	the	responses	to	the	Concept	Paper,76	the	HKEx	published	its	conclusions	 on	 19	 June	 2015,	 stating	 that	 there	 is	 support	 for	 a	 public	consultation	 on	 proposed	 changes	 to	 its	 listing	 rules	 and	 the	 acceptability	 of	DCS.77	In	 its	 conclusions,	 the	 HKEx	 noted	 that	 a	 majority	 of	 respondents	 had	expressed	support	 for	the	use	of	DCS	 in	some	circumstances,	and	expressed	its	belief	 that	 there	are	measures	 to	put	 in	place	 to	mitigate	 the	potential	 risks	 to	investors	 posed	 by	 DCS.	 The	 draft	 proposal	 included	 a	 range	 of	 measures	designed	to	offer	extra	protection	for	shareholders,	such	as	restricting	the	use	of	DCS	to	companies	of	a	certain	size.			However,	the	draft	proposal	to	change	listing	rules	was	unanimously	opposed	by	the	 Securities	 and	 Futures	 Commission	 (SFC)	 on	 the	 ground	 that	 the	 current																																																									70	HKEx,	‘Concept	Paper’	(2014),	n	3,	para	82.	71	See	the	HKEx	Main	Board	Rule	8.11	(GEM	Rule	11.25)	for	the	exceptional	circumstance.	72	Charltons	Solicitors,	‘Hong	Kong	Stock	Exchange	Publishes	Concept	Paper	on	Weighted	Voting	Rights’,	Newsletter	Issue	259,	29	September	2014,	at		<http://www.charltonslaw.com/hong-kong-law/hong-kong-stock-exchange-publishes-concept-paper-on-weighted-voting-rights>	accessed	24	July	2015.	73	The	Listing	Rule	8.11	was	introduced	in	1989	in	response	to	a	stock	market	turmoil	in	March	1987,	which	was	triggered	by	announcements	of	three	companies	with	intention	to	offer	classes	of	ordinary	shares	with	disproportionate	voting	rights	(described	as	‘B'	shares)	via	a	bonus	issue.	74	Flora	Huang	(2015),	2.	75	HKEx,	‘Concept	Paper’	(2014),	n	3.	76	The	responses	were	received	from	listed	companies,	HKEx	staffs,	professional	bodies,	market	practitioners,	institutional	investors	and	retail	investors.	See	the	HKEx’s	website,	‘Responses	to	the	Concept	Paper’,	at		<https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/newsconsul/mktconsul/responses/cp2014082r.htm>	accessed	27	July	2015.	77	For	the	full	text	of	conclusions,	see	HKEx,	‘Consultation	Conclusions:	To	Concept	Paper	on	Weighted	Voting	Rights’	(2015),	at		<https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/newsconsul/mktconsul/Documents/cp2014082cc.pdf	>	accessed	27	July	2015.	
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proposal	 did	 not	 address	 how	 the	 Exchange’s	 proposed	 conditions	 and	safeguards	 pertaining	 to	 the	 structures	 could	 be	 monitored	 and	 what	 actions	could	be	 taken	by	 regulators	or	public	 shareholders	 if	 they	were	not	 complied	with.78	It	 also	 criticised	 the	 regulators’	 subjective	 judgement	 on	 the	 eligibility	criteria	 for	DCS	 companies	 as	 it	would	 give	 rise	 to	 regulatory	 uncertainty	 and	could	result	 in	inconsistent	and	unfair	decision-marking.	Although	HKEx's	draft	proposals	offered	a	number	of	safeguards	 to	prevent	 the	abuse	of	 its	proposed	DCS,	the	SFC	questioned	the	adequacy	of	those	safeguards	in	its	statement.		Last,	the	 SFC	 concluded	 that	 Hong	 Kong’s	 reputation	 would	 be	 harmed	 if	 DCS	structures	became	commonplace,	and	emphasised	that	its	regulatory	function	is	to	‘uphold	the	core	principles	of	fairness	and	transparency	which	underpin	Hong	Kong’s	reputation	as	an	international	financial	centre’.79.			But	 the	SFC’s	response	was	directed	to	primary	 listings	and	didn’t	mention	the	HKEx’s	proposals	regarding	secondary	listings.	Some	commentators	believe	that	the	silence	on	secondary	listing	of	DCS	could	be	a	good	signal	to	potentially	open	the	door	for	a	DCS	company	which	has	already	listed	in	a	market	with	credible	regulatory	standards	to	list	some	shares	in	Hong	Kong.80	This	could	boost	Hong	Kong’s	equity	markets	by	permitting	secondary	 listings	by	US-listed	companies	with	DCS	 structures	 and	 create	 a	 new	way	 for	 companies	 to	 launch	 an	 IPO	 in	Hong	Kong	even	if	their	corporate	structures	would	not	meet	the	requirements	for	a	primary	listing.	Following	the	SFC’s	release,	HKEx	announced	that	it	would	engage	with	the	SFC	to	find	out	‘the	best	way	forward	in	light	of	the	views	of	the	SFC’	as	any	rule	change	must	require	the	approval	of	the	SFC.81		A	subsequent	question	has	been	raised:	why	the	US	can	embrace	DCS	while	Hong	Kong	 cannot?	 Many	 researchers	 and	 practitioners	 try	 to	 find	 out	 some	attributors	 that	 cultivate	 the	DCS	 companies	 in	 the	US	but	 are	not	 available	 in	other	 countries.	 They	 conclude	 that	 legal	 and	 institutional	 frameworks	particularly	relevant	 to	DCS	 include	a	deeper	professional	 investor	base,	better	protection	of	minority	shareholders’	rights	and	a	litigious	culture.82	Unlike	its	US	counterparts,	 Hong	Kong	 stock	markets	 are	 dominated	 by	 retail	 investors	 and	family	 companies	with	 concentrated	 ownership,	 so	 the	 Hong	 Kong	 authorities	place	a	strong	emphasis	on	preventing	abuses	rather	than	curing	these	abuses.83																																																									78	SFC,	‘SFC	Statement	on	the	SEHK’s	Draft	Proposal	on	Weighted	Voting	Rights’,	25	June	2015,	at	<http://edistributionweb.sfc.hk/t/ViewEmail/j/C5CD004D12EE9F25/F672ACDCDBF32846942A2DF08F503B7C>	accessed	27	July	2015.	79	Ibid.	80	Josh	Noble,	‘Hong	Kong	Regulator	Rejects	Proposals	for	Voting	Change’	(Financial	Times,	25	June	2015),	at	<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/12a62b6e-1b1f-11e5-8201-cbdb03d71480.html#axzz3h5fHZQoR>	accessed	27	July	2015.	Also,	see	Ashley	Lee,	‘SFC	Rejects	HKEx	Weighted	Voting	Rights	Conclusions’	(IFLR,	26	June	2015),	at	<	http://www.iflr.com/Article/3465852/SFC-rejects-HKEx-weighted-voting-rights-conclusions.html>	accessed	27	July	2015.	81	HKEx,	‘The	Exchange's	Response	to	the	SFC's	Statement	in	Relation	to	the	Draft	Proposal	on	Weighted	Voting	Rights’,	News	Release,	25	June	2015,	at		<https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/newsconsul/hkexnews/2015/150625news.htm>	accessed	27	July	2015.	82	Chan	and	Ho	(2014),	n	46,	175.	83		A	proportion	of	retail	investors	in	Hong	Kong	is	estimated	to	36	percent.	See	Hong	Kong	Exchanges	and	Clearing	Limited,	Retail	Investors	Survey	2011	(2012),	available	at		
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This	is	also	seen	in	the	litigation	system	that	distinguishes	the	two	jurisdictions.	Hong	Kong	takes	a	more	ex-ante	approach	to	prevent	litigation	from	occurring	in	the	 first	 place	 by	 imposing	 more	 stringent	 IPO	 requirements	 and	 public	disclosure	 while	 the	 US	 takes	 a	 more	 ex-post	 approach	 by	 providing	 various	mechanisms	 to	 investors	and	 lawyers	 to	purse	 lawsuits	 against	 abusers.	84	Due	to	the	different	institutional	conditions,	the	fear	exists	that	the	adoption	of	DCS	would	‘easily	lead	to	a	lessening	of	confidence	in	Hong	Kong	as	a	major	financial	centre’85,	which	is	why	Hong	Kong	opposes	the	indiscriminate	issuance	of	shares.		
D. Singapore		Traditionally,	 Singapore	 held	 firm	 against	 the	 dilution	 of	 the	 principle	 of	proportionality.86	The	Singapore	Stock	Exchange	(SGX)	issued	guidance	in	2011	that	Singapore	did	not	permit	a	listing	of	DCS	on	the	ground	that	they	entrenched	control.87	But	the	listing	of	newspaper	companies	is	an	exception.	The	Singapore	Newspaper	 and	Printing	Presses	Act	mandates	 the	 issue	 of	 separate	 classes	 of	shares	with	 different	 voting	 rights	 by	 Singapore’s	 listed	newspaper	 companies	such	 as	 Singapore	 Press	 Holdings. 88 	Every	 newspaper	 that	 publishes	 in	Singapore	must	create	 two	classes	of	shares:	management	shares	and	ordinary	shares.	 Each	 management	 shareholder	 has	 200	 times	 the	 voting	 rights	 of	 an	ordinary	shareholder	over	any	resolution	relating	to	the	appointment/dismissal	of	 a	 director	 or	 any	 staff	 member	 of	 the	 newspaper	 company.89	Management	shares	 can	 only	 be	 owned	 by	 Singaporean	 citizens	 or	 corporations	 that	 have	been	approved	by	the	government,	also	permissions	to	hold	management	shares	can	be	revoked	by	the	government.90		When	 the	 world’s	 best	 supported	 football	 giant	 Manchester	 United	 gave	 up	Singapore	for	a	New	York	listing	raising	US$233	million	in	2012	mainly	owing	to																																																																																																																																																															<https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/stat/research/Documents/RIS2011.pdf>	accessed	15	December	2015.	In	around	60	percent	of	listed	Hong	Kong	companies,	a	family	controls	at	least	10	percent	of	voting	rights.	See	Richard	Carney	and	Travers	Child,	‘Changes	to	the	Ownership	and	Control	of	East	Asian	Corporations	between	1996	and	2008:	the	Primacy	of	Politics’	(2013)	107	
Journal	of	Financial	Economics	494.	84	King	Fung	Tsang,	‘Listing	Destination	of	Chinese	Companies:	New	York	or	Hong	Kong?’	(2010)	23	Columbia	Journal	of	Asian	Law	357.	85	The	Standing	Committee	on	Company	Law	Reform,	‘The	Third	Interim	Report	of	the	Standing	Committee	on	Company	Law	Reform:	B	Shares’	(July	1987),	para	12.	An	extract	from	that	report	(including	the	relevant	paragraphs)	is	included	in	Appendix	1	of	HKEx,	‘Concept	Paper’	(2014),	n	3.	86	Singapore	Companies	Act,	section	64.		87	SGX,	‘The	Capital	Structure	of	Listed	Companies	in	Singapore	Regulators	Column,	Regulators	Column,	20	September	2011,	at		<http://www.mondovisione.com/news/the-capital-structure-of-listed-companies-in-singapore/>	accessed	6	August	2015.	88	Singapore	Newspaper	and	Printing	Presses	Act	(Cap.206),	section	10.	89	Ibid,	section	10(1).	90	Singapore’s	strict	approach	to	press	regulation	in	particular	public	expressive	conduct	reflects	the	ruling	party’s	belief	that	the	government	has	the	trust	and	respect	of	the	population	fits	[Singapore]	better	than	the	Western.	Singapore	Parliament,	‘White	Paper	on	Share	Values’	(1991),	para.	41;	also	Thio	Li-ann,	‘Between	Apology	and	Apogee,	Autochthony:	The	“Rule	of	Law”	Beyond	the	Rules	of	Law	in	Singapore’	(2012)	Singapore	Journal	of	Legal	Studies	269;	and	Po	Jen	Yap,	Constitutional	Dialogue	in	Common	Law	Asia	(OUP	2015),	118-9	
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the	 denial	 of	 DCS	 by	 the	 SGX.91	It	 raised	 the	 question	 as	 to	 whether	 the	 SGX	missed	attracting	a	global	brand	to	list	because	of	arcane	corporate	governance	practices.	Again,	Alibaba	went	on	to	list	in	NYSE,	achieving	a	spectacular	success	on	its	debut	in	2014,	which	left	some	wondering	how	many	DCS	companies	the	SGX	 could	 afford	 to	 sacrifice	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 its	 one	 share-one	 vote	 principle.92	The	debate	about	allowing	DCS	in	Singapore	was	put	on	agenda	again	in	the	light	of	the	Government’s	process	in	revision	of	the	Companies	Act	to	remove	the	one	share-one	vote	restriction.93		In	 April	 2011,	 the	 amendments	 to	 the	 Companies	 Act	 were	 proposed	 by	 the	Steering	Committee	 for	 the	Review	of	 the	Companies	Act	(Steering	Committee)	which	 was	 established	 in	 2007	 to	 undertake	 a	 comprehensive	 review	 of	 the	Companies	Act.94	The	proposal	suggested	to	allow	companies	to	issue	non-voting	shares	and	shares	carrying	multiple	votes	if	their	Articles	allow	it	and	subject	to	certain	 safeguards.95	In	 doing	 so,	 the	 Steering	 Committee	 explained	 that	 the	rationale	was	that	multiple-vote	shares	and	non-voting	shares	would	allow	such	companies	 greater	 flexibility	 in	 capital	 management.	 One	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	contrary	view	is	that	treating	all	shareholders	equally	in	respect	of	voting	rights	is	fundamental	for	good	corporate	governance	and	minority	shareholder	holders	in	particular	in	the	Asian	context	where	family	companies	are	common.96		The	proposal	by	the	Steering	Committee	was	accepted	by	the	Ministry	of	Finance	(MOF)	 in	 October	 2012.97	The	 MOF	 believes	 that	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	proposal	will	align	Singaporean	law	with	the	main	stream	of	developed	countries	such	 as	 the	 US,	 which	 allow	 DCS.98	In	 connection	 with	 the	 proposal,	 the	 MOF																																																									91	Daniel	Stanton	and	Fiona	Lau,	‘Exclusive:	Manchester	United	drops	Asia	IPO	for	U.S.’	(Reuters,	13	June	2012),	at	<http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/13/us-singapore-us-ipo-manchester-united-if-idUSBRE85C0MO20120613>	accessed	4	August	2015.	92	Goh	Eng	Yeow,	‘'Dual-class	Shares’	May	not	be	Apt	for	S’pore	investors’	(Straits	Times,	15	October	2014),	at	<http://business.asiaone.com/news/dual-class-shares-may-not-be-apt-spore-investors>	accessed	4	August	2015;	and		93	Dayne	Ho	and	Stefanie	Yuen	Thio,	‘Time	to	rethink	dual-class	shares	for	public	listed	companies	in	Singapore’	(Business	Times,	1	October	2014),	at		<http://www.tsmplaw.com/news/Time%20to%20rethink%20dual-class%20shares%20for%20public%20listed%20companies%20in%20Singapore.pdf>	accessed	4	August	2015.	94	MOF,	‘Consultation	Paper	on	the	Report	of	the	Steering	Committee	for	Review	of	the	Companies	Act’	(June	 2011),	at		<https://www.acra.gov.sg/uploadedFiles/Content/Publications/Public_Consultation/SCReportComplete28Jul.pdf>	accessed	4	August	2015.	95	Ibid,	16,	‘Recommendation	3.4	-	Companies	should	be	allowed	to	issue	non-voting	shares	and	shares	with	multiple	votes;	Recommendation	3.5	–	Section	64	should	be	deleted’.		96	Drew	&	Napier	LLC,	‘Amendments	to	the	Companies	Act:	(1)	Multiple-vote	Shares	and	Non-voting	Shares;	(2)	Electronic	Register	of	Members’,	27	November	2014,	at	<	http://www.drewnapier.com/Publications-Events/Legal-Updates/Amendments-to-the-Companies-Act-(1)-multiple-vote	>	accessed	5	August	2015.	97	MOF	and	ACRA,	‘Review	of	the	Singapore	Companies	Act	–	Ministry	of	Finance’s	Responses	to	the	Report	of	the	Steering	Committee	for	Review	of	the	Companies	Act’,	(3	October	2012),	paras	70-75,	at		<http://www.mof.gov.sg/portals/0/Public%20Consultation/AnnexA_SC_RCA.pdf>	accessed	4	August	2015.	98	Ibid,	para.71.	
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stipulates	 that	 certain	 safeguards	 are	 to	 be	 introduced.99	In	 May	 and	 October	2013,	MOF	and	the	Accounting	and	Corporate	Regulatory	Authority	(ACRA)	had	sought	two	rounds	of	public	consultation	on	the	draft	Companies	(Amendment)	Bill	2013.100				The	 Companies	 (Amendment)	 Bill	 (No.25/2014)	 was	 passed	 by	 Parliament	 in	October	 2014.101	The	 Amendment	 allows	 public	 companies	 to	 issue	 different	classes	of	shares	with	either	no	voting	rights	or	multiple	voting	rights	with	the	removal	of	the	one-share-one-vote	restriction.102	SGX	and	Monetary	Authority	of	Singapore	 (MAS)	 are	 reviewing	 where	 DCS	 could	 extend	 to	 listed	 companies.	SGX’s	 existing	policy	of	not	 listing	 issuers	with	DCS	 structures	will	 continue	 to	apply	 pending	 the	 conclusion	 of	 the	 review.103	From	 the	 first	 quarter	 of	 2016,	public	 companies	 in	 Singapore	 can	 issue	 ordinary	 shares	with	 different	 voting	rights.104	By	 allowing	 DCS,	 Singapore’s	 attractiveness	 as	 a	 listing	 destination	would	be	enhanced.	
	Although	the	Amendment	is	believed	to	boost	local	markets,	some	commentators	suggest	 that	 regulators	 should	 liberalise	 the	 regulatory	 framework	 in	 a	calibrated	way,	 rather	 adopt	 the	US	model	 of	DCS	 structures	wholesale.105	One	suggestion	 is	 limiting	DCS	 to	certain	companies,	 such	as	 technology	companies	
																																																								99	Ibid,	para.	72.	Safeguards	include:	(i)	shareholders	must	approve	the	issuance	of	shares	with	different	voting	rights	via	a	special	resolution;	(ii)	information	on	the	voting	rights	for	each	class	of	shares	must	accompany	the	notice	of	meeting	at	which	a	resolution	is	proposed	to	be	passed;	(iii)	companies	must	specify	the	rights	for	different	classes	of	shares	in	their	Articles	and	clearly	demarcate	the	different	classes	of	shares	so	that	shareholders	know	the	rights	attached	to	any	particular	class	of	shares;	and	(iv)	holders	of	non-voting	shares	will	have	equal	voting	rights	on	resolutions	to	wind	up	the	company	or	on	those	that	vary	the	rights	of	non-	voting	shares.	100	MOF	and	ACRA,	‘Public	Consultation	on	the	Draft	Companies	(Amendment)	Bill	2013’	(2	May	2013),	at	<https://www.acra.gov.sg/Publications/Public_Consultation/Public_Consultation_on_Draft_Companies_Amendment_Bill_2013/>,	and	‘Public	Consultation	on	Additional	Proposed	Amendments	to	the	Companies	Act’	(23	October	2013),	at	<https://www.acra.gov.sg/Publications/Public_Consultation/Public_Consultation_on_Additional_Proposed_Amendments_to_the_Companies_Act/>	accessed	4	August	2015.	101	On	15	April	2015,	ACRA	announced	that	the	legislative	changes	to	the	Companies	Act	will	be	effected	in	two	phases.	The	first	phase	will	be	implemented	on	1	July	2015.	The	second	phase	will	commence	in	the	first	quarter	of	2016.	See	ACRA,	‘Two-Phase	Implementation	of	Companies	(Amendment)	Act	2014’,	at	<https://www.acra.gov.sg/Legislation/Two-Phase_Implementation_of_Companies_(Amendment)_Act_2014/>	accessed	4	August	2015.	For	the	summary	of	the	key	changes	of	Companies	Act,	see	Wai	Yee	Wan,	‘Recent	developments	in	Singapore	on	company	law	and	regulation:	review	of	the	Singapore	Companies	Act’	(2014),	35(5)	
Company	Lawyer	143.	102	The	Companies	Act	(Amended)	section	64	and	64A.	103	ACRA,	‘Key	Legislative	Amendments	to	Be	Effected	in	Phase	2’,	at		<https://www.acra.gov.sg/Legislation/Companies_Act_Reform/Key_legislative_amendments_to_be_effected_in_Phase_2/>	accessed	6	August	2015.	104	Drew	&	Napier	LLC	(2014);	and	Lance	Lim,	‘Recent	Amendments	to	the	Companies	Act:	Rethinking	Dual-class	Shares	in	Singapore	–	Caveat	Emptor?’,	1	January	2015,	at	<http://www.lawgazette.com.sg/2015-01/1219.htm>	accessed	6	August	2015.	105	Straits	Times,	‘Dual-Class	Shares	could	help	Boost	Local	Market’,	16	November	2015,	available	at<http://www.straitstimes.com/business/companies-markets/dual-class-shares-could-help-boost-local-market>	accessed	15	December	2015.	
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and	mega-sized	listings.106	The	former	appears	to	be	based	on	the	recent	trend	of	technology	 companies	 using	 DCS.	 For	 the	 latter,	 Large	 IPOs	 will	 attract	institutional	 investors	who	 are	 better	 equipped	 to	 evaluate	 company	 business	and	 management.	 It	 has	 also	 been	 proposed	 that	 some	 restrictions	 and	safeguards	 should	 be	 imposed	 on	 DCS,	 including	 the	 suspension	 of	 superior	voting	 in	 certain	 trigger	events	 such	as	 insolvency	or	qualified	accounts,	 and	a	three-year	sunset	provision	for	companies	with	existing	structure.107			
E. Tokyo		Historically	almost	all	listings	on	Japanese	stock	exchanges	had	been	of	common	shares.	 The	 only	 exception	 was	 Inpex	 Corporation,	 a	 privatised	 oil	 company,	issuing	shares	with	veto	rights	(so-called	golden	shares)	owned	by	the	Japanese	government	 in	 November	 2004.108	The	 provisions	 of	 the	 Commercial	 Code	relating	to	joint	stock	companies	were	replaced	by	the	Japanese	Companies	Act	2005,109	which	incorporated	certain	fundamental	changes	with	respect	to	classes	of	shares.	Article	108	of	the	Companies	Act	2005	allows	a	stock	company	to	issue	more	than	one	types	of	share.	A	company	issuing	more	than	two	types	of	shares	under	 its	 articles	 of	 association	 is	 called	 a	 shurui	 kabushiki	 hakkou	 kaishi	(company	issuing	class	shares).		In	response	to	the	Companies	Act	2005,	the	Advisory	Group	on	Improvements	to	the	 Tokyo	 Stock	 Exchange	 (TSE)	 Listing	 System	 published	 its	 ‘Comprehensive	Improvement	Programme	for	Listing	System	2007’	in	April	2007,	discussing	the	requirements	for	listing	of	shares	classified	with	respect	to	voting	rights	and	the																																																									106	Stefanie	Yuen	Thio,	‘Is	Singapore	Ready	for	Dual-Class	Shares?’,	Business	Times,	15	October	2015,	available	at<http://business.asiaone.com/news/singapore-ready-dual-class-shares>	accessed	15	December	2015.	107	Mak	Yuen	Teen,	‘Say	“No”	to	Dual	Class	Shares’,	Business	Times,	27	November	2015,	available	at<http://www.businesstimes.com.sg/opinion/say-no-to-dual-class-shares	>	accessed	15	December	2015.	108	The	term	‘Golden	share’	arose	in	the	1980s	when	the	British	government	retained	golden	shares	in	companies	in	privatized,	and	later	the	concept	emerged	in	Russia	and	other	European	countries.	They	are	typically	held	by	the	government	in	the	process	of	the	privatization	of	a	government	company.	They	empower	the	government	the	decisive	voting	rights,	thus	to	veto	all	other	shares	in	a	shareholder	meeting.	The	‘Golden	share’	concept	was	introduced	to	the	Japanese	Companies	Act	2005	as	‘preferred	shares	with	veto	rights’	under	Article	108.	For	the	more	details	of	the	evolution	of	Golden	share,	available	at:	<http://www.mutantfrog.com/2011/06/13/the-tale-of-inpex-and-the-golden-share>	accessed	14	October	2015.	109	Japanese	Companies	Act	was	enacted	in	2005	and	is	experiencing	its	first	reform	which	resulted	in	‘the	Outline	for	the	Companies	Act	Reform’	in	2012.	Based	on	the	Outline,	the	amendments	to	the	Companies	Act	(including	several	provisions	concerning	corporate	governance)	were	passed	by	the	Diet	on	20	June	2014	and	took	into	effect	in	May	2015.	The	English	version	of	the	full	legal	text	of	Japanese	Companies	Act	2005	is	available	at	<http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=338223>	accessed	28	September	2015.	For	the	details	of	the	Outline,	see	Goto	Gen,	‘The	Outline	for	the	Companies	Act	Reform	in	Japan	and	its	Implications’	(2013)	35	Journal	of	Japanese	Law	13.	And	for	the	latest	amendment	to	the	Companies	Act,	see	Masamichi	Sakamoto	and	Yohei	Harima,	‘Companies	Act	Reform	2014:	Can	the	New	Amendment	to	the	Companies	Act	of	Japan	Strengthen	the	Corporate	Governance	System	of	Japanese	Listed	Companies’	(2014)	City	Yuwa	Partners,	available	at	<	http://www.city-yuwa.com/english/publication/shared/PDF/JLG201415_cy_56-59.pdf>	accessed	28	September	2015.			
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circumstances	in	which	such	shares	should	not	be	permitted.110	The	new	listing	rules	 were	 implemented	 in	 July	 2008,	 consolidating	 a	 draft	 outline	 of	 a	 new	listing	 system	 for	 classified	 shares,111	and	 the	 ‘Listing	 System	 Improvement	 FY	2008’.112	The	 new	 listing	 rules	 relax	 regulations	 on	 the	 use	 of	 certain	 kinds	 of	DCS	 in	 IPOs.	 But	 existing-listed	 companies	 are	 still	 prevented	 from	 issuing	 a	diverse	assortment	of	class	shares.			In	 the	new	rules,	 ‘shares	classified	with	respect	 to	voting	rights’	are	defined	as	shares	with	no	voting	rights,	shares	with	voting	rights	exceeding	other	classes	of	shares,	and	shares	with	voting	rights	fewer	than	the	other	classes	of	shares.	The	TSE	will	decide	whether	a	company	is	qualified	to	issue	two	or	more	classes	of	shares	having	different	voting	rights	on	a	case-by-case	basis,	taking	into	account	any	concern	 that	 the	 interests	of	existing	 shareholders	might	be	 impaired.	The	examination	 of	 an	 application	 for	 the	 issuance	 of	 such	 shares	 will	 involve	 a	formal	 examination	 and	 a	 substantial	 examination.	 A	 formal	 examination,	equivalent	 to	 listing	 requirements	 of	 common	 stocks,	 will	 check	 the	 applicant	company’s	conformity	to	the	numerical	criteria	defined	in	the	‘Criteria	for	Stock	Listing	Examination’.113	The	substantive	examination	will	determine	whether	the	scheme	 of	 the	 relevant	 shares	 respects	 the	 interests	 of	 shareholders	 on	 the	individual	application	basis.			Cyberdyne,	known	for	the	HAL	robot	suit,	was	the	first	company	with	DCS	listed	in	TSE	in	March	2014.114		Cyberdyne	is	authorised	to	issue	two	classes	of	shares	–	common	stock	and	class	B	stock.	Shareholders	of	both	classes	of	stock	have	the	same	rights	with	respect	to	dividends	and	distributions	upon	liquidation.	But	a	class	B	shareholder	has	10	times	as	many	voting	rights	as	a	common	shareholder	given	the	same	unit	sizes.	Class	B	shares	were	held	only	by	Yoshiyuki	Sankai,	the	president	and	CEO	of	the	company,	and	two	foundations	for	which	he	serves	as	a	representative	director.		After	the	IPO	of	Cyberdyne,	the	TSE	again	amended	its	listing	rules	on	DCS	in	July	2014	in	the	course	of	the	detailed	examination	of	Cyberdyne’s	listing.115	Two	key	points	addressed	in	the	2014	amendment	are	(1)	necessity	and	appropriateness																																																									110	TSE,	‘Comprehensive	Improvement	Programme	for	Listing	System	2007’,	24	April	2007,	available	at:	<http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/equities/improvements/general/tvdivq0000004iib-att/2007programjokyo-e.pdf>	accessed	28	September	2015.	111	The	contents	of	the	Outline	are	summarised	by	Kazuhiro	Yoshii,	‘A	New	Share-listing	System	in	Japan’,	July	2008,	available	at	<https://www.amt-law.com/en/pdf/bulletins3_pdf/080821_1a.pdf>	accessed	15	October	2015.	112	TSE,	‘Listing	System	Improvement	FY2008’,	27	May	2008,		available	at	<http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/equities/improvements/general/tvdivq0000004iib-att/080527.pdf>	accessed	15	October	2015.	113	An	overview	of	the	IPO	on	the	TSE	is	available	at	the	website	of	Japan	Exchange	Group	(JPX),	at	<http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/equities/listing-on-tse/new/basic/index.html>	accessed	15	October	2015.	114	Nikkei,	‘Cyberdyne	to	Debut	on	TSE	Mothers	Market	in	March’,	20	February	2014,	available	at<http://asia.nikkei.com/Markets/Tokyo-Market/Cyberdyne-to-debut-on-TSE-Mothers-market-in-March>	accessed	28	September	2015..		115	Koji	Toshima,	‘Cyberdyne’s	Dual-class	IPO’,	9	December	2014,	available	at		<http://www.iflr1000.com/NewsAndAnalysis/Cyberdynes-dual-class-IPO/Index/1662>	accessed	28	September	2015.	
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for	 use	 of	 a	DCS;	 and	 (2)	 a	 sunset	 clause.116	The	 former	 requires	 that	 a	DCS	 is	necessary	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 common	 interests	 of	 shareholders	 to	ensure	 that	 a	 certain	person	 continues	 to	 be	 involved	 in	 the	business,	 and	 the	structure	is	appropriate	to	achieve	such	necessary	purpose.	Under	this	new	rule,	the	TSE	will	examine	the	nature	of	shares	of	class	stock	and	determine	whether	a	DCS	is	necessary	from	the	common	interests	of	shareholders.	The	latter	of	sunset	clause	 prescribes	 that	 the	 weighted	 stock	 converts	 to	 common	 stock	 if	 the	necessity	of	the	DCS	ceases	to	exit.		Despite	 some	 restrictions	 on	 DCS,	 some	worry	 that	 opening	 door	 to	 DCS	may	exaggerate	 agency	 problems	 by	 a	 group	 structure	 in	 listed	 companies,	 where	public	shareholders	may	be	harmed	by	the	activities	of	controlling	shareholders	or	 group-based	 management.117	According	 to	 the	 TSE	 White	 Paper	 in	 2015,	among	 TSE-listed	 companies,	 629	 companies	 (18.4	 percent)	 have	 controlling	shareholders. 118 	Out	 of	 them,	 61.8	 percent	 (11.4%	 overall)	 have	 parent	companies	and	38.2	percent	 (7.0	percent	overall)	have	controlling	shareholder	other	than	a	parent	company.	Insiders	holding	more	voting	rights	relative	to	cash	flow	 rights	 would	 extract	 more	 private	 benefits	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 outside	shareholders,	in	particular	in	the	context	of	Japan	where	a	high	percentage	of	a	cross-shareholding	structure	between	company	and	bank	has	severely	destroyed	transparency	and	information	disclosure	of	capital	market.119			
IV. Conclusion	
	The	weighted	voting	rights	structure	is	always	controversial	and	is	criticised	by	advocates	of	corporate	governance	as	it	is	regarded	as	a	breach	of	the	principle	of	 one	 share-one	 vote.	 However,	 the	 findings	 from	 the	 empirical	 studies	 on	ownership	disproportionality	do	not	entirely	agree	with	the	theory.	Enthusiasts	believe	that	DCS	allow	entrepreneurs	to	bring	their	ideas	to	the	public	market	at	an	early	stage,	and	enable	companies	to	plan	for	the	long	term.		Around	 the	 Top	 5	 global	 financial	 centres,	 most	 of	 them	 welcome	 or	 have	changed	their	rules	to	allow	DCS.	The	permission	of	the	use	of	DCS	upon	an	IPO	by	New	York	which	has	the	largest	stock	exchange	in	the	world	raises	a	difficult																																																									116	TSE	New	Listing	Guidebook,	‘Guidelines	for	Listing	Examination	II	6.(4)’,	available	at<http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/equities/listing-on-tse/new/guide/tvdivq0000002g9b-att/bv22ga0000001ufs.pdf>	accessed	14	October	2015.	117	Hideki	Kanda,	‘Regulation	of	Controlling	Shareholders	in	Japan’,	a	presentation	on	EU	Asia	Corporate	Governance	Dialogue	Conference	2015,	available	at<http://law.nus.edu.sg/clb/events/EACG_Dialogue_Conference2015/pdfs/hideki_rcsj_slides.pdf>	accessed	15	December	2015;	and	Sergey	Chernenko	et	al,	‘Agency	costs,	Mispricing,	and	Ownership	Structure’	(2010),	NBER	working	paper	No.	15910	(arguing	that	ownership	structures	including	pyramids,	business	groups,	DCS,	are	prone	to	agency	problems.)	118	TSE,	‘TSE-Listed	Companies	White	Paper	on	Corporate	Governance	2015’,	8-9,	available	at<	http://www.jpx.co.jp/equities/listing/cg/tvdivq0000008jb0-att/2015.pdf>	accessed	15	December	2015.	119	Ronald	Masulis	et	al,	‘Agency	Problems	at	Dual-Class	Companies’	(2009)	64	Journal	of	Finance	1697;	and	Teng-Kee	Tan	and	Xiao	Fang	Fu,	Proceedings	of	the	International	Conference	on	Chinese	
Enterprise	Research	2007	(World	Scientific	2008),	169	(Usually	60-70	percent	of	corporate	stock	is	possessed	by	banks	in	Japan.	Consequently,	not	only	is	the	agency	problem	not	easy	to	be	discovered,	but	a	lot	of	information	cannot	be	disclosed).	
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question	 for	 stock	 exchanges	 and	 financial	 authorities	 in	 other	 countries.	Singapore	 and	 Tokyo	 follow	 in	 its	 footsteps	 to	 reform	 their	 listing	 framework	and	company	law	to	grant	such	voting	arrangement.	On	the	other	hand,	they	in	particular	 Tokyo	 also	 try	 to	 prevent	 the	 misuse	 of	 DCS	 by	 examining	 the	necessity	 and	 appropriateness	 of	 the	 structure.	 By	 contrast,	 London	 and	Hong	Kong	 stand	 firm	 on	 restrictions	 on	 such	 structure	 to	 protect	 investors	 from	exploitation	 despite	 the	 long	 debates	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 attract	 high-profile	technology	companies	to	list	in	the	territory.			Researchers	and	practitioners	have	tried	to	 find	out	why	the	attitudes	 towards	DCS	are	diversified	 in	different	 jurisdictions.	There	must	be	 some	reasons	 that	DCS	are	permitted	and	work	well	so	far	in	the	US,	yet	such	structures	have	been	criticised	 elsewhere	 for	 insufficient	 investor	 protection.	 One	 possible	explanation	 is	 the	discrepancy	 in	 legal	and	 institutional	 frameworks	 that	allow	listed	 companies	 to	 adopt	DCS	 structure	 in	 favour	 of	 selected	 shareholders.	 In	contrast	to	the	US,	the	powerful	position	of	institutional	investors	and	the	break-through	 rule	 in	 the	 UK	 may	 deter	 the	 development	 of	 DCS.	 Similarly,	 a	paternalistic	 approach	 by	 Hong	 Kong	 to	 prevent	 exploitation	 of	 shareholders	beforehand	leads	the	authorities	to	choose	shareholder	fairness	over	profit.		In	a	nutshell,	the	suitability	and	adaptability	of	DCS	is	largely	path	dependent	on	the	pre-existing	institutional	frameworks	of	the	exchange	as	well	as	the	jurisdiction	in	concern.			One	 way	 or	 another,	 DCS	 provides	 plenty	 of	 material	 for	 argument	 between	competition	 and	 shareholder	 protection.	 It	 also	 brings	 challenges	 to	 other	jurisdictions	whether	 to	 relax	 the	ban	on	 such	 shares,	 in	pursuit	of	 its	push	 to	become	an	appealing	venue	for	emerging	technology	companies.		
